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N MARCH 21, 2005, parties to the long-running litiga-
tion in Doe v. Unocal announced that a final settlement
had been reached.1 The announcement brought wide-
spread cheer to those who hope to make transnational
corporations accountable for their perpetration of and complicity
in human rights abuses. But perhaps those most encouraged by the
news were the claimants in the matter, the Burmese villagers, who
will benefit from a settlement that includes direct compensation
and “substantial assistance” via funds for programs to improve liv-
ing conditions, health care, and education. It is unquestionable to
those who have followed the Unocal litigation since its launch in
1996 how much the Burmese deserve this restitution. 
Unocal was accused of knowingly using forced labor to con-
struct its Yadana gas pipeline, which stretches through Burma into
Thailand. Unocal contracted with the notorious military junta in
control of Burma to provide security for the project. The junta
forced local people to work to clear the way for the pipeline and its
accompanying infrastructure. Soldiers used tactics such as murder
and rape to compel people to work. In their case against Unocal,
the Burmese villagers claimed that the California oil giant was
liable on the basis of its complicity in the junta’s wrongdoing. The
Burmese citizens sued Unocal in the United States because they
believed that the political situation in Burma strongly militated
against the possibility of justice being achieved in Burmese courts.2
This article will examine the Unocal litigation as part of the
international movement to make transnational corporations
accountable for human rights violations. Specifically, it argues that
a corporation’s role in such violations creates indirect legal liability
to victims, even if the direct harm was caused by another party. A
growing phenomenon in the pursuit of making corporations
accountable is to initiate litigation in the country where the corpo-
ration is incorporated. Since there is currently no binding interna-
tional legal framework to govern the behavior of transnational cor-
porations, civil litigation represents one of the only avenues
through which these results may be achieved. Because there is very
little legal precedent in this area, or a detailed statute on which to
rely in bringing such litigation, each court decision frames the
extent of a corporation’s legal liability. Although the Unocal settle-
ment has left some questions unanswered regarding corporate
complicity in human rights violations, it is a positive legal develop-
ment and will serve as a practical precedent for further develop-
ments in this important arena. 
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (ATCA) of 1789 grants jurisdiction
to the U.S. courts to hear claims brought by aliens for torts commit-
ted in breach of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Initially enacted to provide redress for torts such as piracy, the ATCA
has been interpreted in recent times to permit aliens to sue individual
defendants for violations of their rights.
THE UNOCAL LITIGATION
The Unocal litigation,3 brought under the ATCA, is one of a
number of cases against corporations that alleged liability for
human rights violations in foreign countries. Other cases included
a case against the Anglo-Dutch oil company Shell for its complic-
ity in grave human rights abuses in Ogoniland, Nigeria4 and a case
against the Canadian company Talisman Energy for its complicity
in genocide in Sudan.5
The Unocal litigation had proceeded farther than any other
case against corporations brought under the ATCA. Before the case
settled it was due to be tried before a jury in California in 2005,
along with parallel litigation alleging violations of the state’s tort
laws. Many considered that it might be the first case to successful-
ly charge a corporation with indirectly violating human rights.
Thus far, cases brought under the ATCA have been bogged down
by procedural difficulties, dismissed, or settled.6 At the very least,
a jury trial in the Unocal litigation could have shone public light
on the evidence against the company and brought about account-
ability for the alleged wrongdoings. 
THE TIDES TURNS AGAINST CONTEMPORARY
USE OF THE ATCA
TOWARD THE END OF 2004 the tide of ATCA litigation — both
legal and political — was turning against claimants in these matters.
The Bush administration had, through a series of amicus briefs, made
evident its strong opposition to the contemporary use of the Act
against corporations and other defendants accused of human rights
violations.7 In the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision, the Court limit-
ed the ATCA’s jurisdictional application to violations of the law of
nations. Also of particular relevance to the Unocal claimants was
14
Rachel Chambers is a British barrister. She wrote this article while working as a
researcher at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University in
Melbourne, Australia. Her research was part of an Australian Research Council
Linkage project on the human rights responsibilities of multinationals. 
The Unocal Settlement: 
Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity 
in Human Rights Abuses
by  Rache l  Chamber s
Displaced Burmese villagers.
Ea
rt
hR
ig
ht
s I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l
the dismissal of Khulumani, et al. v. Barclays in a New York District
Court, which held that the ATCA does not provide for an aiding
and abetting theory of liability.8
THE SOSA DECISION
The long-awaited decision last year in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain was the first Supreme Court pronouncement on contem-
porary use of the ATCA. The case concerned the abduction of
Mexican national Dr. Alvarez-Machain by a fellow Mexican, José
Francisco Sosa, who had been hired by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency to detain Alvarez-Machain to bring him to
stand trial in the United States. Those opposed to an expansive
interpretation of the ATCA saw the litigation as an opportunity to
limit its applicability to the original intentions of Congress. 
On June 29, 2004, human rights advocates celebrated the
Supreme Court decision that held that the ATCA continues to
allow victims to sue in U.S. courts for the most serious human
rights abuses, which are classified as violations of the law of nations
under the ATCA.9 But the victory was not absolute. The Supreme
Court limited ATCA claims to those involving violations of “spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory” international norms — violations
of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy — and ruled that an illegal detention of less than one day
did not violate a well-defined norm of customary international law.
Despite the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach, courts should
not be slow to accept new causes of action under the ATCA. 
THE KHULUMANI LITIGATION
The judgment in Sosa paved the way for cases against corpo-
rations for complicity in gross human rights abuses, albeit on some-
what reduced footing. A few months after the Sosa decision, the
Khulumani complaint came before a District Court in New York.
Khulumani, a South African NGO representing 32,000 victims of
the apartheid regime, sued transnational corporations, including
banks such as Barclay’s and Citigroup, and mining companies, such
as Rio Tinto, for their alleged role in supporting and profiting from
the apartheid regime in South Africa. Judge Sprizzo, the federal dis-
trict judge sitting on the case, dismissed the case because he deter-
mined that judgments from the Nuremburg tribunals and the inter-
national courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were not
binding sources of international law, even though these sources had
been used by judges in the Talisman10 and Unocal11 litigation to
underpin liability for aiding and abetting. These judgments explore
the nature of aider and abettor liability under international human
rights law, which is of significance to the corporate complicity
claims that judges must decide based upon whether the action in
question was a breach of the law of nations. 
THE UNOCAL POSITION ON COMPLICITY
Before the Unocal case was settled in 2002, Judge Pregerson
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote an opin-
ion for the panel holding that, as constructed by international
jurisprudence, Unocal could be held liable on the basis of aiding
and abetting under the ATCA for abuses that it knew about and
substantially assisted through practical encouragement or support.
Such encouragement and support included hiring the Burmese
military to protect the pipeline.12 This decision overturned a lower
court ruling that Unocal’s liability rested upon its intention to
commit these abuses. The importance of this judgment cannot be
understated. The vast majority of serious complaints about
transnational corporations concern their alleged role in support-
ing, encouraging, and benefiting from the egregious human rights
abuses committed by joint venture partners, suppliers, and other
groups with whom they do business. But, in the majority of these
cases it is hard to prove that the corporations in question intended
to commit the abuses. Although the Ninth Circuit accepted that
Unocal may be liable under the ATCA if it was found to have aided
and abetted the Burmese Junta, Judge Sprizzo, in Khulumani,
completely rejected the notion that aiding and abetting liability is
contained within the ATCA. Judge Sprizzo concluded that if
Congress had intended such liability to be covered by the statute it
would have expressly included such a provision.
UNOCAL AND KHULUMANI — UNDERSTANDING THE
CONTRADICTING DECISIONS ON COMPLICITY
THE DIVERGING APPROACHES HAVE BEEN attributed by one com-
mentator to the differing political persuasions of the judges in the two
cases: Judge Pregerson has a reputation for being liberal while Judge
Sprizzo is seen as conservative.13 This observation, however, fails to
note a more fundamental difference between the two cases. Although
the Khulumani claims against the mining companies alleged direct col-
lusion with the South African government in the violation of workers’
rights, the other claims were more general, alleging that the corporate
defendants aided and abetted the South African government in the
human rights abuses it perpetrated under the system of apartheid. The
impugned conduct of the corporations included supplying goods to
the South African military with the knowledge that such goods would
be used in the maintenance of the apartheid system and the decision
to invest in South Africa per se. The requisite causal connection
between the companies and the human rights violations suffered in
the country may be tenuous in these other cases. Indeed, the broader
policy concern of those favoring a more restrained use of the ATCA
against transnational companies is that imposing such an expansive
conception of liability might discourage these corporations from
investing in developing countries and inhibit vital economic growth. 
The difference between the two cases is clear. In Unocal, the
corporate defendant provided direct support and assistance to
those who committed the human rights violations, while in
Khulumani, the allegations extended to “mere” beneficial or indi-
rect complicity in the state’s wrongdoing.14 This latter type of com-
plicity has not been accepted by international tribunals such as the
15
“The vast majority of serious
complaints about
transnational corporations
concern their alleged role in
supporting, encouraging, and
benefiting ... from egregious
human rights abuses ...”
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
as a breach of international criminal law. 
Further, Khulumani is a large scale and “unwieldy” lawsuit,
brought by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defendants and
covering events that took place over many years in different loca-
tions. Although the manageability of a case does not have any
impact on legal liability, it may have been an underlying consider-
ation that helped to persuade Judge Sprizzo to reject the
Khulumani complaint. Unocal, on the other hand, involved only
15 plaintiffs, one defendant,15 and a number of clearly defined
incidents that amounted to egregious human rights abuses. 
The fact remains, however, that Judge Sprizzo’s decision came
after the Supreme Court in Sosa had circumscribed the contempo-
rary use of the ATCA and has been interpreted as following a more
restrictive approach.16 Although in the past federal courts may
have been open to arguments that novel torts amounted to breach-
es of the law of nations actionable under the ATCA,17 Judge
Sprizzo looked to the strict letter of the statute, found that it did
not cover aiding and abetting liability, and refused to extend its
reach beyond the three traditional torts contemplated when the
ATCA was created (violations against safe conduct, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy). Despite Khulumani’s dis-
appointing result, it cannot be discarded entirely because it fol-
lowed the Sosa precedent. What remains to be seen is whether
courts will follow Judge Sprizzo in holding that aiding and abet-
ting liability is not actionable under the ATCA given that this con-
tradicts the decision in Unocal. As discussed below, the first signs
suggest that they will not. 
CONCLUSION
THE Unocal SETTLEMENT TOOK PLACE on December 13, 2004,
just one day before the Ninth Circuit was due to hear an appeal en
banc from the 2002 decision. As a result, it is unknown where the law
now stands. The Unocal and Khulumani decisions present differing
understandings of aiding and abetting liability, which will need to be
resolved. Fortunately the wait will not be long; Khulumani is now
under appeal in the Second Circuit and other cases that address this
issue are being heard in courts around the country. Key amongst these
is Talisman, mentioned above, which concerns genocide, war crimes,
and torture perpetrated by the Sudanese government. As set out in the
most recent decision,18 the complaint alleges that “Talisman and the
Government worked together to devise a plan for the security of
the oil fields”; that Talisman “hired its own military advisors to
coordinate military strategy with the Government”; and that there
were regular “meetings involving Talisman, Army intelligence, and
the Ministry of Energy and Mining where Talisman would map
out areas intended for exploration and they would discuss how to
dispose of civilians in those areas.” 
In June 2005 the district court in Talisman held that aiding
and abetting or “secondary” liability is actionable under the
ATCA.19 The court refused an appeal on this point in August
2005.20 Talisman had argued, relying on Sosa, that secondary lia-
bility was not sufficiently accepted in international law to support
an ATCA claim. Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Unocal, the
court held that the notion of liability in international law “for
knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of the crime” is a core principle
that forms the foundation of customary international legal
norms.21 The Second Circuit should follow this approach when it
hears the Khulumani case on appeal.
The settlement of the Unocal litigation signifies that there will
be no further judicial scrutiny of the circumstances of that case and
the applicability of secondary liability to them; however, Unocal’s
willingness to pay substantial sums rather than continue to litigate,
coupled with the recent trend in enforcing accountability for aid-
ing and abetting liability as exemplified in the recent Talisman
decisions, will hopefully make corporations who operate in close
contact with perpetrators of human rights abuses think very care-
fully about their role in these wrongdoings. HRB
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1 EarthRights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal,
http://earthrights.org/news/unocalsettlefinal.shtml (May 10, 2005); Unocal
News Release Archive, Settlement Reached in Yadana Pipeline Lawsuit,
http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/2005news/032105.htm (March 21, 2005).
2 The U.S. Department of State, Burma Country Report on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1998 815 (Dep’t. of State 1999), states, “the Government continued to
rule by decree and was not bound by any constitutional provision providing
for fair public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the British legal
system were formally in place, the court system and its operation remained
seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of political cases.”
3 The Unocal litigation was the first in which it was held that ATCA actions
could apply to private corporations. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
4 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 392 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2004). This case con-
cerned events leading up to the execution of campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa.
5 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 374 F. Supp. 2d
331(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6 Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart
Publishing 2004). Chapter 4 details the “formidable” procedural obstacles
plaintiffs must overcome to bring ATCA claims. Examples of cases that have
failed to surmount these hurdles include Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), In re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, 634 F. Supp 842, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and Flores v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
7 Example briefs include Department of State, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal of the Judgment Against Defendant-Appel-
lant Jose Francisco Sosa, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
6595.doc (March 20, 2000) and EarthRights International, Brief for United
States of America as Amicus Curiae, http://www.earthrights.org/atca/dojbrief.pdf
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munity’s “responsibility to protect” those
whose governments leave them vulnerable to
gross human rights violations. Commonly
known as R2P, this doctrine obliges each
Member State to protect its citizens and oth-
ers within its jurisdiction from war crimes,
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. It also calls for interna-
tional diplomatic and humanitarian inter-
vention, as well as the use of peacekeeping
troops in situations where mass atrocities
and gross human rights violations are taking
place, and where peaceful means are inade-
quate to counter such abuses. Notably, the
doctrine supports the collective intervention
of the international community, rather than
that of a single state or small group of states. 
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
Although R2P does not specifically
address post-conflict situations, Member
States agreed to formulate an inter-govern-
mental Peacebuilding Commission (PC).
This advisory body will assemble relevant
actors to coordinate the reconstruction and
institution-building efforts for effective and
integrated post-conflict development.
Participants will include the country or
countries in question, regional governments,
major contributors to the relief effort, UN
experts, and international financial institu-
tions. Each PC meeting will address a specif-
ic country or sub-region. The PC will also
have a standing organizational committee
that can refer situations to the PC and that
will be composed of members of the
Security Council, ECOSOC, top UN
donors, and those states providing the bulk
of military aid. To fund these initiatives,
Member States asked the Secretary-General
to establish a post-conflict Peacebuilding
Fund, supported by voluntary contribu-
tions. The PC is scheduled to begin its work
by the end of this year.
Additionally, Member States endorsed
creating a standing police force that would
provide start-up capability and general assis-
tance to the policing component of UN
peacekeeping missions. The idea grew from
the need to have a rapid response team that
would be able to assist operations in crisis.
This police force is less powerful than the
standing military force some member coun-
tries sought to establish, and questions
remain regarding its constitution, funding,
and size.
CONCLUSION: MAINSTREAMING
HUMAN RIGHTS
THE UNITED NATIONS’ new initiatives rep-
resent the international community’s
increased focus on mainstreaming human
rights. The Human Rights Council, the
Responsibility to Protect, and the
Peacebuilding Commission signify a step
forward in the protection and promotion of
human rights around the world. Moreover,
the decision of Member States at the 2005
World Summit to double the funding for
the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights over the next five years is
another good indicator of an increased com-
mitment to defending human rights. The
remaining question is whether the funding
and political will exist to make these organi-
zations as transparent, credible, and effective
as possible. Critics fear that to make only
cosmetic changes from a Commission to a
Council, or to proclaim a specific responsi-
bility and then fail to execute it, would not
only defeat the reform efforts, but would
further endanger current and future victims
of gross human rights violations. HRB
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(May 8, 2003). The United States government is not the only government to
oppose the use of the ATCA in claims against transnational corporations. In
July 2005 the Toronto Star newspaper reported that the Canadian government
had for the third time attempted to put pressure on U.S. authorities to have
the Talisman case thrown out. See Sudan: The Passion of the Present, Canada
Asked U.S. to Intervene in Talisman Case, http://platform.blogs.com/pas-
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9 EarthRights International, In Our Court: ATCA, Sosa and the Triumph of
Human Rights: A report about the Alien Tort Claims Act, http://www.earth-
rights.org/pubs/inourcourt.html (July 2004).
10 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), as cited in Joseph, Corporations (Hart Publishing 2004). In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, the court agreed that interna-
tional criminal law was the appropriate source of law in determining whether
the corporate defendant had aided and abetted the Sudanese government in
committing war crimes and genocide. 
11 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 Joseph, Corporations (2004).
13 Anthony J. Sebok, Unocal Announces it will Settle a Human Rights Suits:
What is the Real Story Behind its Decision?, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
sebok/20050110.html (Jan. 10, 2005).
14 See Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339 (2001), for a
discussion of the different types of complicity and the use of the terms “benefi-
cial” or “indirect” complicity. Note that the authors classify the Unocal litiga-
tion in this category rather than as an example of direct complicity based on a
different understanding of the facts of the case.
15 Initially, Unocal’s business partner French oil company Total SA was a co-
defendant, but it was held in Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 27 F.Supp.2d 1174
(C.D. Cal. 1998), that the California court did not have jurisdiction over
the company.
16 Sebok, Unocal Announces it will Settle a Human Rights Suits,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050110.html.
17 For example, it was held in Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372,
1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000), that the plaintiff could bring a claim under the ATCA
for violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
18 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, No. 01 Civ.9882, 2005
WL 2082847, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).
19 Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d 331.
20 Note, however, that the court refused to grant leave to appeal on this point,
stating that the case would proceed whether or not secondary liability was
accepted because the plaintiffs also alleged primary liability.
21 Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 340-341.
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